This is the title of a New York Times interview of an emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, which appeared in the February 9th 2014 edition of that newspaper. His name is Alvin Plantinga; he was also a former president of both the Society of Christian Philosophers and of the American Philosophical Association. He is also the author of several books, most recently, of "Where the Conflict Really Lies; Science, Religion, and Naturalism." The interview was conducted by Gary Gutting, a professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.
The subject of the interview, the first of a series, is religion. Mr. Plantinga is a theist and a scholar. I was quite curious to learn what he has to say about what is for me an important subject. (Why do I have such an interest, when so many educated people I know do not? I readily confess that a sense of transcendence is very much part of my experience; I have difficulty, however, giving it content, specifically theistic content. I welcomed the article; perhaps this learned man would give me some new insights. I am sorry to say that, for the most part, he didn't.)
This article discusses Mr. Plantinga's arguments for theism, or at least against atheism, and contains my responses to each one of them.
He presents four reasons why a theistic view might be more valid than an atheistic one: 1) The fine-tuning of the universe; 2) the problem of suffering and evil as a possible argument
for theism, specifically the Christian version of it; 3) the intuition of peoples of all cultures that some form of theism is valid, and finally, 4) his assertion that materialism and evolution are incompatible. Let us discuss each point in turn.
Theistic Argument 1: The fine-tuning of the universe. Mr. Plantinga states, quite correctly, that our universe is extraordinarily fine-tuned, without which life would not be possible. If several elemental properties of the universe--such as the strength of gravity--were slightly different, life would not have evolved on our planet. He states, "If the force of the Big Bang had been different by one part in 10 to the 60th, life of our sort would not have been possible." This does seem to indicate that such precision could not have occurred by chance. His conclusion: "This fine-tuning is vastly more likely given theism than given atheism."
Commentary: Not so fast!
Let us discuss the fine-tuning first, then indicate possible natural causes that gave rise to it. Mr. Plantinga is not entirely correct when he refers to the "force of the Big Bang"--he is referring to the force of inflation, the vacuum energy, which caused an incredibly rapid expansion of the universe very, very shortly after the universe came into existence. (This is the inflation model developed by Alan Guth in the 1960s; it is widely accepted today.) The energy of the early universe existed in what is called a false vacuum, which is exceedingly unstable, resulting in a rapid expansion of the universe before the vacuum entered its stable, resting state. During the exceedingly short period of 10 to the minus 35 seconds--that is, almost a billionth of a billionth of a billionth of a billionth of a second, the universe doubled 100 times. (When I was a child, I used to imagine how incredibly rich I would be at the end of a month, if I received a penny on day one, and subsequently received a doubling of the amount on each consecutive day. There would, of course, not be enough money in the world to continue this doubling for a hundred days.) The inflationary period caused the universe to expand from a speck to the astounding size of 10 to the 400th light years! The reason that our observable universe has a diameter of "only" twenty-seven billion light years is due to the fact that light from the vast hidden areas of the universe has not had enough time to reach us.) The cause of the inflation is the cosmological constant, the same force behind the expansion of the universe observed today. (This "dark energy" no longer exists in the false vacuum state; after the inflationary period, the big bang expansion, as is the case ever since, no longer has an exponential quality.) Mr. Plantinga is wrong, however, about the fine-tuning of the cosmological constant to "one part in 10 to the 60th." Here is what a contemporary physicist has to say about the fine-tuning of the cosmological constant: (Carlos I. Calle, in his book,
The Universe, page 156):
The experimental discovery of the speeding up of the expansion of the universe 9 billion years after the big bang requires that all the vacuum energy contributions cancel out to 120 decimal places. Cancellation to that accuracy is impossible to comprehend..What if we take the total number of atoms in the world or, better yet, the total number of elementary particles and performed a similar cancellation? That would be 51 decimal places. Even if we consider the estimated total number of elementary particles in the observable universe, we would get only 80 decimal places. (My note: The total number of elementary particles in the entire universe would bring us to a cancellation well beyond 120 decimal places!) A cancellation to 120 decimal paces requires extremely delicate fine-tuning!
The universe is even more, incredibly more, fine-tuned than the 60 decimal places of cancellation that Mr. Plantinga cited!
His conclusion, however, that this provides strong evidence for theism does not follow. He quotes a recent development in physics and leaps to the belief that it is an indication of God's existence, a belief which he, being a Catholic philosopher, presumably already had. What do physicists have to say? After all, this is their realm of expertise. I have read many books on cosmology and have yet to discover a physicist who entertains the belief that the fine-tuning of the universe indicates a creator. Most of the books have chapters that assert that the universe has not been consciously designed by an external source. There are many scientific theories that explain the fine-tuning of the universe. (Most entail a multiplicity of universes referred to as the multiverse.) For instance, if string theory, which entails the existence of hidden, extra dimensions, proves to be correct, the many Calabri-Yau configurations of these dimensions would produce an astounding 10 to the 500th power number of universes! If such a large number of universes exist, it is not surprising that some of them are extraordinarily fine-tuned. It is also not surprising that we live in one of them, since if our universe had been incompatible for the development of life,we wouldn't be here to observe it. (This is called the anthropic principle.) If another theory, the eternal inflation model, is correct, universes are constantly being created, without beginning, without end. This would lead to a virtually infinite number of universes. In a multiverse with an infinite number of universes, there would also exist an infinite subset of universes that possess extraordinary fine-tuning. Another promising theory is the cyclic model, an eternal cycle of creation and destruction, which would also solve the problem. Perhaps the most extraordinary theory has been recently advanced by Stephen Hawking, one of the foremost physicists of today. According to him, the beginning of the universe was a quantum event; there was no single outcome, but a quantum superposition of possible outcomes. Our observations today determine which of the many possible outcome occurred
in the past. This need not be the most likely outcome, but merely a possible outcome. If this proves to be true, the problem of fine-tuning is solved!
Granted, none of these theories have been proven, but they are quite elegant and provide natural explanations of the fine-tuning. Scientists are overwhelmingly convinced that there is a natural explanation for the extraordinary value of the cosmological constant and other examples of fine-tuning in the universe.
You might have recognized Plantinga's argument: it is a variation of the assertion that since a watch correctly indicates its origin at the hands of a watchmaker, a frog, something much more complex than a watch, similarly indicates its origin at the hands of a creator. This was used as proof that Darwin's theory of evolution is invalid. Darwin's theories, however, are now overwhelmingly supported by evidence; the impersonal source of creation, using Dawkins's apt phrase, is a blind watchmaker; natural laws and fossil discoveries provide thoroughly convincing evidence that evolution, without the intervention of a god, has occurred.
Mr. Plantinga appears to be an adherent of the Catholic notion of natural philosophy, that is, observation of natural phenomena logically leads to a belief in God. This is an example of medieval philosophy, unsupported by evidence. Very few modern scientists would agree with him.
Theistic Argument 2: Suffering and the problem of evil as indications
for theism. To be fair, Mr. Plantinga asserts at the beginning that the problem of evil--how can an all-powerful and all-loving God allow suffering-does "have some strength" and provides "presumably" the greatest challenge to theism. But he also asserts there are many plausible counter-arguments. He gives the one he presumably believes to be most cogent:
Think about it: The first being of the universe, perfect in goodness, power and knowledge, creates free creatures. These free creatures turn their backs on him, rebel against him and get involved in sin and evil. Rather than treat them as some ancient potentate might--e.g,. having them boiled in oil--God responds by sending his son into the world to suffer and die so that human beings might once more be in a right relationship to God. God himself undergoes the enormous suffering involved in seeing his son mocked, ridiculed, beaten and crucified. And all this for the sake of these sinful creatures.
I'd say a world in which this story is true would be a truly magnificent possible world. It would be so good that no world could be appreciably better. But then the best worlds (would) contain sin and suffering.
Commentary: These arguments can be very easily dismissed. First of all, we assume that we have free will, but the actuality of it is very ambiguous. Our conscious mind (our awareness) is only a fraction of our entire mind, the unconscious portion of which is largely responsible for many of our actions. (It is the mass of the iceberg underneath the surface that is moved by currents, not the relatively small portion above the surface.) Since actions result from an inscrutable relationship between how an individual brain is wired and its environment, it is, in my opinion, very problematic to judge the person who performs a bad deed. (It is much easier, of course, to judge the deed.) So how free are humans really? Possibly an unanswerable question, it is that complex. Perhaps a more realistic assessment would be, "Tout savoir, c'est tout pardonner"--to understand everything is to forgive everything. In addition, if God gave us free will and we mess things up, certainly he could prevent the worst aberrations of that free will, such as the Holocaust. A little fine-tuning of God's design would have been most welcome here! It is, moreover, incorrect to reduce the entire gamut of evil and suffering to free will. What about babies born with horrible congenital defects? I remember a case during my training at the children's ward of a cancer hospital. One little boy, aged about eight, had been born with slowly growing tumors throughout his body, so many that surgical intervention was at best only palliative. By the time I saw him he was nothing more than a little bag of pain waiting for death. Did free will cause that evil? What about appendicitis? The appendix is a vestigial structure that was important in our distant ancestors for the digestion of cellulose. It serves no function in human beings. But it can get infected, burst, and cause death. I ask again, did free will cause that evil? Is God responsible or can such evils be attributed to the indifference of nature? The answer, to me at least, is obvious.
His assertion that the Christian story redeems suffering,
literally redeems suffering, is also untenable. He obviously believes that Jesus of Nazareth is "the only-begotten Son of God," as traditionalist Christians assert. There is not a shred of evidence for this. It may indeed have great symbolic meaning, and may indeed be an excellent myth to help Christians lead better lives, but as a literal account of God's intervention into history, it is no more plausible, say, than the lovely Greek myth of Philemon and Baucis. Just because, in Mr. Plantinga's mind, the Gospels reveal the best of all possible worlds, doesn't mean that they are true. The assertion that Christian beliefs are based on facts is very problematic. If they are facts, Jews, for instance, are in need of getting their facts straight. I find this view to be highly offensive. Judaism, in my opinion, is an equally valid faith; its mythology might be different, but all mythologies, I believe, point in the same direction. What is essential is how close one comes to living according to the Golden Rule, a form of which is the essence of all religion. (Most atheists accept some form of the Golden Rule as well.)
Mr. Platinga's arguments here are medieval and parochial. I don't see how an objective, twenty-first century mind could ever come to such conclusions.
3. Theistic Argument 3: Mr. Plantinga asserts that the intuition that God exists, evident in all cultures since time immemorial and still very much present today, is a good indication that God is real.
Commentary: He states, "Many people of very many different cultures have thought themselves in experiential touch with a being worthy of worship." For this he uses Calvin's winsome phrase,
sensus divinitatis, an intimation present in us all. This is undoubtedly true. I really think what he is referring to here is a sense of transcendence. This sense, however, doesn't inevitably lead to theism. Buddhists deny that there is a supreme being, but are certainly filled with a sense of transcendence that gives their lives meaning. If Plantinga's view here is slightly modified to refer to a sense of transcendence rather than to theistic beliefs, I do believe he is on to something here. Simone Weil once said that it is easy to be an atheist except for two things; the existence of beauty and the existence of suffering. I understand this very well. When I play Bach on the piano, even as imperfectly as I am able to, I am overwhelmed with the sense that there is more than meets the eye and that it, whatever it is, is meeting my ear as I play. There must be something that transcends our everyday lives, I tell myself, for I have experienced it. Similarly, suffering takes us beyond complacence also, albeit in a much less pleasant way. That human beings, the highest form of creation known, can suffer so abjectly, is difficult to accept. This is too horrible, there must be something else, we tell ourselves when we become acutely aware of intolerable suffering in others.
The experience of transcendence, however, does not prove that it refers to something beyond us. (I would have a difficult time, however, convincing myself that Bach's music is merely a bunch of notes.) Unlike Mr. Platinga, I believe that transcendence exits in the human mind and does not come from "out there" even though things "out there," such as the glories of physics, can trigger it. Ir is also possible that a sense of transcendent is a "trick' of our genes, causing us to become better adapted to our environment; if this is the case, it would have become a trait favored by natural selection. I am not convinced that this is entirely explanatory, however; the sense of transcendence remains, for me at least, a profound mystery. I have no doubt, however, that such experiences don't automatically lead to theistic beliefs.
Theistic Argument 4: Materialism and evolution are incompatible.
Commentary: I really don't follow his arcane reasoning here; the assertion that materialism and evolution are incompatible is not, to put it mildly, universally accepted. Here is a summary of his argument: say you have a belief that there is a beer in the fridge. He states "It's the virtue of...electrical signals sent via efferent nerves to the relevant muscles, that the belief about the beer in the fridge causes me to go to the fridge. It is not by virtue of the content, since if I went to the fridge without believing a beer was in it would have the identical neurophysiolgic properties." This means, according to him, that the content of a belief causing an action doesn't matter. This is a highly dubious proposition. Brain cells reveal a very complex pattern of interconnection. Various desires can elicit the same physiologic response--in this case walking to the fridge. A belief does not consist from the outset of a path from the brain to the muscles--it must trigger a neurophysiolgic response. It doesn't follow from the fact that different thoughts can trigger the same neuromuscular response that the belief has an immaterial origin
Although I think his reasoning is wrong, I do believe he is on to something here: the mystery of mysteries of the universe, consciousness. Scientists are finding more and more correlations between areas of the brain and specific thoughts; an explanation of consciousness, however, remains elusive. How those tiny Betz cells are able to convince us that we are individuals, that is, more than tiny Betz cells, is for me the true
mysterium tremendum et fascinans. Many scientists believe that the problem of consciousness will one day be solved; others, like Niels Bohr, have asserted that we never will understand it. (The complexity of quantum physics, he believed, is child's play compared to the complexity of consciousness. It is a little like water trying to explain water; we are consciousness and cannot separate ourselves from it in order to give it a complete explanation.)
Consciousness is so basic, that we tend to take it for granted, which is true even among scientists. Where would science be without consciousness, which makes science possible? Some scientists, some philosophers, some religious leaders--notably of the Hindu kind--believe that consciousness is everything, and nothing really exists beyond it. I don't really fully comprehend their arguments, but I do believe they are at least partially correct. If they right, the fine-tuning of the universe would be intrinsic to consciousness, and would no longer be a problem. (See Hawking's argument, discussed above in the commentary section of the first theistic argument.)
Consciousness is
the mystery, Mr. Plantinga, not whether God exists or not. I hold that a belief in a deity external to our minds is no longer tenable for an objective person living in the twenty-first century. I read somewhere that an important physicist--I forget which one--believes that philosophy is no longer "where it's at" and cannot compete with physics, the theories of which fascinate and the discoveries of which continue to transform our lives and ways of thinking. If Mr. Plantinga is typical of philosophers today, I would definitely be on the side of that physicist. (I am convinced that if Augustine were alive today, he would be a scientist and not a theologian.)
Mr. Platinga has gone to bat four times in the interview. The first two times were strikes. The second two were fouls. Perhaps Mr. Platinga, an eminent representative of Catholic philosophy, will hit a home run yet. As preparation for the possibility of hitting the ball out of the park, however, I would recommend that he take a sabbatical and bone up on physics and cosmology.